Friday, July 31, 2026Today’s Paper

Ex-National Arts Council Board Mops The Floor With Gayton McKenzies’ Face

Sports, Arts and Culture Gayton McKenzie has been dealt a blow when the Pretoria High Court suspended his decision to dissolve the National Arts Council (NAC) board members and ordered him to reinstate them pending the outcome of a judicial review.

Judge Stuart Millar delivered the judgment after hearing the urgent application on 29 July, finding that the former council members had established the requirements for interim relief while they challenge the legality of the minister’s decision.

The applicants, who served as members of the NAC council, approached the court after McKenzie dissolved the council on 25 May 2026 in terms of Section 5(5) of the National Arts Council Act, which allows the minister to dissolve the council on “reasonable grounds”.

In his judgment, Millar ruled that the application was urgent, rejecting the minister’s argument that the applicants had created their own urgency by delaying the court challenge.

The judge found that the dissolution itself deprived the applicants of access to the council’s resources, forcing them to arrange funding and legal representation in their personal capacities before approaching the court.

The dispute centres on two letters sent by McKenzie to the council. In the first, dated 22 April, the minister requested that the council convene a special meeting to consider a once-off settlement of a long-running labour dispute over unpaid employee performance bonuses.

The council scheduled the meeting for 29 May. However, four days before it was due to take place, McKenzie dissolved the council, stating that it had failed to deal with the matter urgently enough and citing concerns over governance and procurement.

Millar questioned whether those reasons could justify dissolving the council.

He noted that the minister’s April letter did not prescribe a deadline by which the special meeting had to be held and that the council had already scheduled the meeting requested by the minister.

“The NAC did not have the opportunity to consider the issue that had been referred to it by the Minister,” the judge said, adding that the council had complied with the request to convene a meeting.

The court also found that the minister’s references to unspecified procurement concerns and a broader breakdown in governance lacked sufficient detail at this stage to justify the dissolution.

Although Millar stressed that he was not deciding whether reasonable grounds ultimately existed, he held that the minister’s decision did not withstand scrutiny for the purposes of the interim application.

The court further rejected McKenzie’s contention that the National Arts Council could continue functioning under its chief executive officer while a replacement council was appointed.

Millar held that the National Arts Council Act requires the organisation to operate under a council and that the chief executive officer does not have the statutory authority to exercise the council’s functions independently.

“The Act does not provide for a situation where the NAC is to function without a Council,” the judge said.

He found that the applicants had established a prima facie right to remain in office pending the review, faced irreparable harm if the dissolution remained in place and had no satisfactory alternative remedy.

The court suspended the minister’s decision to dissolve the council and ordered that the applicants and the remaining council members be reinstated until the review proceedings are finalised.

McKenzie was also interdicted from implementing the dissolution, taking further steps arising from it or commencing any process to appoint a replacement council pending the outcome of the review.

The minister was ordered to pay the costs of the urgent application, including the costs of two counsel.

The substantive review application, which will determine whether McKenzie’s decision to dissolve the council was lawful, is still to be heard.

Don't Miss