South Africa’s construction safety system is being undermined by weak enforcement, inadequate oversight, limited municipal capacity and professional accountability failures, according to investigations into four building and structural collapses that claimed 17 lives and injured 24 people.
The findings, released by Public Works and Infrastructure Minister Dean Macpherson on Thursday, come after a series of serious incidents between December 2025 and March 2026, including fatal collapses in Verulam, Soweto and Johannesburg, as well as a construction-site incident in Cape Town.
The investigations were commissioned by the Council for the Built Environment (CBE) following the Ormonde collapse in Johannesburg, where nine workers died and six were injured.
While investigators found that the four incidents had different immediate causes, Macpherson said they revealed recurring weaknesses in the system responsible for ensuring that buildings were properly designed, approved, constructed and monitored.
“These incidents demanded more from Government than expressions of sympathy. They demanded answers,” Macpherson said.
The findings raise questions about whether authorities have sufficient visibility over construction taking place in their jurisdictions and whether existing regulatory safeguards are being properly enforced.
Construction outside the regulatory system
The Redcliffe collapse in Verulam provides one of the clearest examples.
A five-storey reinforced-concrete administrative and office building at the River Range Ranch Temple complex collapsed on 12 December while concrete was being poured on its upper levels. Five people died and 11 were injured.
Investigators could not establish a single definitive technical cause because critical information was unavailable.
There were no complete structural drawings, investigators could not identify the responsible construction team, and no built-environment professional responsible for the design and supervision of the building could be positively identified.
More significantly, the building had no approved building plans and no construction work permit.
The Department of Employment and Labour had also not been notified that construction had started, while no built-environment professionals had been appointed for the project.
The investigation described Redcliffe as “a case of ignoring the law”, with the absence of approvals effectively allowing a substantial multi-storey building to be constructed outside the formal regulatory system.
This meant the project was also outside the ordinary inspection and oversight mechanisms that should have applied to a development of its scale.
Known risks left unresolved
The Doornkop collapse in Soweto points to a different but equally troubling problem: authorities had already identified the danger.
A portion of a two-storey residential structure in Thulani Extension 2 collapsed in the early hours of 28 December after heavy rainfall. A 60-year-old woman, her 24-year-old daughter and her one-year-old granddaughter died, while three other occupants were injured.
The property was situated on high-risk dolomitic land, a danger that had been known for decades.
A decision had been taken in the late 1990s to relocate residents because of the dolomite risk. Compensation was paid, the property was vacated and demolition began, but part of the original structure remained.
Years later, another family moved into the abandoned building.
Investigators found that the most probable cause of the collapse was a shallow sinkhole or doline beneath the structure, resulting in the loss of foundation support.
But the broader finding was about governance.
Authorities knew the land was dangerous, yet the risk was not managed through to its conclusion.
“The government had already identified this land as unsafe, but the risk was not managed through to its conclusion,” Macpherson said.
The investigation also identified weaknesses in Johannesburg’s management of dolomitic land, including concerns about dedicated risk-management capacity, preventing unlawful occupation of high-risk land and ensuring that the public was adequately informed about hazards.
Investigators described Doornkop as “a case of not enforcing the law.”
Even compliant projects are not immune
The Magnolia development in Sea Point illustrates another dimension of the problem.
Unlike Redcliffe and Ormonde, the residential development had complied with applicable planning requirements and had the necessary professionals appointed.
Yet on 17 February, approximately 40 square metres of temporary formwork at Level 3 became unstable and failed, injuring four of about 140 workers on site.
The investigation found that the immediate cause was the premature loading of an incomplete and uninspected temporary structure.
The affected deck had not achieved the required structural stability, had not been formally inspected and had not been approved for loading before material was placed on it.
The incident therefore demonstrates that regulatory compliance on paper is not sufficient.
As Macpherson put it: “Compliance cannot simply exist in documentation. Every safety control has to operate at the point where work is actually being performed.”
The project had safety audits and professional oversight, and corrective measures were implemented before work continued.
For Macpherson, that distinction matters because the findings do not suggest that every construction project is inherently unsafe.
Rather, they expose different points at which the system can fail.
Ormonde: “A disaster waiting to happen”
The most serious of the four incidents occurred in Ormonde, Johannesburg, where nine workers died and six were injured after part of an industrial building under construction collapsed on 2 March.
The investigation identified significant deficiencies in the structural steelwork supporting suspended floors, including concerns about connection details, the selection of structural members and the overall structural configuration.
The structure failed while concrete topping was being placed.
Investigators concluded that the beams and columns supporting the affected slabs effectively had no capacity to carry the additional load being applied during the construction operation.
There were also significant regulatory concerns.
No application for building approval had been submitted to the City of Johannesburg before the collapse. An application was only submitted afterwards.
Investigators further raised concerns about the professional engineering arrangements on the development, including the involvement of an engineer who had previously been deregistered by the Engineering Council of South Africa.
These professional matters have been referred for further investigation by ECSA.
The investigation described Ormonde as “a disaster waiting to happen.”
The investigations further point to a system that does not necessarily lack legislation, but one in which existing rules are not consistently implemented or enforced.
“There is already an extensive regulatory framework dealing with planning, building standards, occupational health and safety, professional regulation, municipal approvals and construction,” Macpherson said.
But the investigations identified “inconsistent implementation, inadequate oversight, weak enforcement and non-compliance” as the principal problems.
Among the key concerns are inadequate municipal building-control capacity, insufficient inspection resources, weak information-sharing between regulators and inadequate verification of professional competence.
The investigations also found that building control cannot end once plans have been approved.
“Building control cannot stop when a plan receives a stamp,” Macpherson said. “Authorities need visibility over what happens during construction.”
“Authorities need to know when construction begins, whether construction corresponds with approved plans, who has accepted professional responsibility and whether inspections and certification are taking place.”
Macpherson said municipalities are at the front line of building regulation, but the investigations raised concerns about shortages of suitably qualified building-control personnel, limited inspection capacity and the ability of municipalities to identify construction that has never entered the approval system.
The CBE has recommended stronger information-sharing between municipalities, the Department of Employment and Labour, the National Home Builders Registration Council and professional councils.
It has also proposed mechanisms to improve the early detection of major construction activity, including potential ward-level reporting and systems that could alert building-control authorities to significant construction projects.
Macpherson said consequence management must also be strengthened, particularly where owners, developers, contractors or professionals deliberately ignore statutory requirements.
The investigations recommend stronger sanctions for violations of planning and construction requirements, including more serious consequences where non-compliance contributes to death or serious injury.
Macpherson was particularly critical of construction taking place before approval is obtained.
“Building approval is not unnecessary red tape. It is a public-safety control,” he said.
“The purpose of obtaining approval before construction is precisely to allow the relevant authority to consider whether what is proposed complies with the law before people are exposed to risk.”
The minister has directed the CBE to share the findings and recommendations with affected municipalities and other stakeholders.
Where professional conduct requires investigation, the relevant professional council will be approached, while matters that may point to criminal conduct will be referred to law-enforcement authorities.
Macpherson said the human cost should remain central to the response.
“Seventeen people died in the four incidents before us today. That number should remain at the centre of our response.”
